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RETROSPECTIVE CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a new approach to  the taxation of capital gains that 
eliminates the deferral advantage present under current realization-based 
systems, along with  the lock-in effect and  tax arbitrage possibilities 
associated with  thia deferral advantage.  The new approach also taxea capital 
gains only  upon  realization but, by  effectively charging interest on  past 
gains when  realization finally occurs, eliminates the incentive to defer such 
realization.  Unlike a similar scheme suggested previously by  Vickrey, the 
present one does not require knowledge of  the potentially unobservable pattern 
of  gains over time.  It thus is applicable to a  very  broad range of capital 
assets. 
Alan  J. Auerbach 
Department of  Economics 
University of  Pennsylvania 
3718 Locust Walk 
Philadelphia, PA  19104-6297 1 
I.  Introduction 
Virtually every country that taxes income imposes a  capital gains tax 
only upon  the realization of  gains rather than on  accrual.  Though countries 
vary  with  respect to indexing for inflation and  the relative tax rates on 
capital gains and ordinary income, the realization-based tax system sets 
capital gains taxation apart from other forms of  taxation and is associated 
with a  variety of  economic distortions. 
The moat  frequently discussed problem arising from taxing capital gains 
upon  realization is the "lock-in" effect, the desire to hold  appreciated 
assets in order to defer taxes on gains already accrued.  This effect leads 
investors to  accept a lower rate of  return before-tax than they would for new 
investments without such accrued gains, resulting in  a distorted allocation of 
capital and inefficient  portfolio selection. 
As an illustration of  the lock-in effect,  consider a simple two-period 
example in which an  investor, having accrued a first-period gain, g, must 
decide whether to realize the gain and reinvest at  the safe rate of  return, i, 
or hold  the asset for an  additional, safe rate of  return r.  Assuming all 
capital income is taxed at  the same rate,  t, then the investor's terminal 
wealth under  the first strategy is 
(1)  — (l+g(l-t))(l+i(l-t))  — (l+g)(l+i) 
- t[g(l+i(l-t))+(l+g)i) 
In  second-period units, total taxes equal those paid  in  the first period, 
accumulated at  the net-of-tax interest rate, plus those due in the second 
period. 
If  the investor chooses to hold  rather than sell, the terminal wealth 
is: 2 
(2)  WH 
— (1+g)(l+r)-t[(l+g)(l-i-r)-1]  — (l+g)(l-i-i) 
-  t[g+(1-t-g)r] 
so that the tax on  the first-period gain is deferred, without interest, to the 
second period.  This makes the investor willing to hold  even  for a range of 
returns r C i.  The larger is g, the larger the deferral advantage and hence 
the lower r must be to  induce the investor to sell. 
A convenient way to express this deferral advantage is in terms of  the 
effective tax rates on  alternative investments.  Compared to  the rate t 
imposed if  the investor realizes and reinvests, the additional taxes, per unit 
of  additional gain (l+g)r, are (comparing (1)  and (2))  t{l-  C t. 
It  is through this lower effective tax rate that an  investor can achieve at 
least his alternative after-tax return i(l-t) despite receiving a before-tax 
return r C i. 
Closely related to  the lock-in effect is the general problem of  tax 
avoidance facilitated by  the voluntary nature of realization.  Because losses 
as  well as gains have their tax burdens deferred until realization, investors 
have  the incentive to realize bases immediately, to maximize the associated 
tax reductions.  Aggressive application of  the simple rule of  holding winners 
and realizing losers potentially permits individuals to generate tax 
reductions without incurring major transaction  costs (Constantinidea 1983, 
Stiglitz 1983).  This  arbitrage possibility has led to a second major 
distortion arising from  the present system of  capital gains taxation.  To 
prevent inveatora from  generating capital losses to offset ordinary income, 
tax systems typically limit the allowable annual deduction for auth losses. 
In  the U.S., thim limit is presently 3000 dollars.  While perhaps representing 
an  effective response to the problem of  tax arbitrage, this loss-offset 
limitation also distorts the choice of  investment away  from the risky assets 3 
more likely to  produce losses (e.g.  Stiglitz 1969). 
Given such problems, there is grest appeal to the prospect of  switching 
to a tax on  accrued capital gains.  Taxing gains on  accrual would make the 
actual realization of  gains irrelevant to individual tax liabilities, thereby 
eliminating both  the lock-in effect and the ability to engage  in tax arbitrage 
through selective realizations.  It  would also obviate the need  for limiting 
loss-offsets and the associated discouragement of  risky investments.  Though 
proposals to adopt accrual taxation have  received serious scholarly attention 
(e.g.  Shakow 1986), there seems little chance that such a system will be 
adoptad on a  broad scale.1  Beyond the criticism that accrual taxation would 
increase annual taxpayer compliance costs, parhaps the most significant 
arguments against it  are that some assets are hard to  value except when  they 
are sold and that liquidity constraints could force the premature sale of 
indivisible assets simply to pay the accruing taxes.  These two problems would 
often apply at  the same time, as with the case of  closely held  family 
businesses,  for example. 
A potential solution to the problems of  both  realization and accrual 
taxation is a realization-based tax that offsets the deferral advantage of 
holding gains by  imposing a higher tax rate on gains held  for longer periods 
of  time.  The effect is to simulate a system under which capital gains taxes 
are computed on an  accrual basis but collected, with  interest, only upon 
realization.  From a comparison of  (1) and (2),  it  is clear that charging tax- 
deductible interest on  the taxes accruing on  unrealized gains would eliminate 
the deferral advantage.  Such an  spproach was originally conceived of by 
Vickrey  (1939).  By  construction, it  would eliminate the lock-in effect and 
the tax arbitrage possibilities generated by  selective realization, because of 
its equivalence to an accrual tax.  At  the same time, it  would  also remedy the 4 
liquidity problem of  accrual taxation  by  collecting the tax only when sales 
actually occurred. 
Unfortunately,  this "cuisulative  averaging" approach is plagued by the 
second problem of  accrual taxation mentioned above, that of  valuation.  For 
assets that are hard  for the government to value except when sold, it will be 
unclear upon  sale what  the time pattern of  accrual of  the realized gain was. 
This will make  it  impossible to  compute retrospectively the tax liability 
equal in  present value to an  annual tax on  the asset's accrued gains (Green 
and Sheshinski 1978).  For example, if  an asset has increased in  value over a 
ten year period, the tax rate on the realized gain needed to  simulate accrual 
taxation would by the ordinary tax rate if  the gain occurred entirely in  the 
tenth year, but this tax rate compounded by  one plus the relevant interest 
rate to the ninth power  if the entire gain  occurred during the first year  of 
ownership.  Simply to  assume, for tax purposes, that s realized gain accrued 
smoothly at a constant annual rate would not solve the problem.  Assets 
achieving above-noraal rates of  return initially would still be subject to  a 
lock-in effect, because an  investor anticipating only normal returns from the 
asset in  the future would be  able to  spread the accrual pattern 
retrospectively imputed for this gain over several years by  holding on to  the 
asset.  Likewise, an  asset that had  declined in value would offer its owner 
the incentive to sell.  Thus, basic arbitrage transactions involving the 
holding of  winners and the sale of losers would still be  attractive, though 
perhaps less so than under a pure realization-based tax. 
Glesrly, many capital assets such as common shares of  large companies 
could be  marked  to market each year to  avoid the valuation problem.  But so 
effective method of  dealing with hard-to-value assets would still be  necessary 
to make a switch to accrual taxation  or  accrual-equivalent realization S 
taxation practical.  Thia paper preaents auch a  method.  The new apptoach does 
not require any information on  the past pattern of  accrued gains, and yet 
eliminates the lock-in effect and the benefits of  deferral-based tax 
arbitrage.  In  place of  the private information on the accrued gains of 
individual aasets, the scheme uses public information, the market  interest 
rate, combined with the assumption of  optimal portfolio choice by investors. 
It doea not impose the same effective tax rate on  accrued gains, g 
regardless of their time pattern, but it does impose the same tax rate, 
after adjusting for risk. 
This new  approach to  capital gains taxation can  accommodate any  asset 
currently subject to capital gains treatment, and its information requirements 
are small.  Indeed, it  does not require knowledge of  the asset's purchase 
price, only  its year of  purchase. 
In  the next section, we formalize the criterion that a capital gains tax 
must satisfy in  order not to distort the holding period decision or  allow 
deferral-based arbitrage.  To  provide the basic intuition about the new scheme 
developed here  and how it works, we introduce and analyze it first, in  Section 
III,  for a special class of  assets (such as precious metals) that generate no 
cash flows or  tax liabilities until they are sold.  Section IV presents the 
solution for the general class of assets, and Section V offers some concluding 
remarks. 
II.  Holding-Period Neutrality 
The present system of  taxation upon realization distorts behavior because 
the rate at which it taxes the income arising from an  asset depends on  the 
size of  the asset's previous unrealized gains.  This induces both  the lock-in 
effect and deferral-related tax arbitrage. 6 
Suppose the risk-free interest rate is i,2 and the investor's tax rate on 
all forms of  income, including realized capital gains,  is  t.  Then, as shown 
above, an investor holding an  appreciated asset will require a  before-tax 
teturn (adjusted for risk) lass than  i  from that asset to achieve his 
after-tax opportunity cost of  i(l-t),  because the tax rate  t  applied to new 
gains is offset by the continued deferral, without interest, of  taxes payable 
on the gains already generated but not yet realized.  This is the 
lock-in-effect.  It encourages the holding of  assets likely to generate a 
significant portion of  their returns in  the form of  capital gains, because 
their income faces a tax rate below  t  if they are held  for longer than one 
year, but it also imposes a tax-induced transaction cost on  selling assets 
that increases over time and reflects no  underlying social cost. 
The problem of  tax arbitrage relates to  the lower effective tax rate 
generated by  deferral rather than the distorted realization decision.  Since 
assets turned over immediately face an effective tax rate  t, investors can 
acquire two aasats with  offsetting risk characteristics and generate negative 
tax payments in  present value by  realizing positions that have  declined in 
value aooner, and more frequently, than positions that have increased in 
value.  To the extent that such offsetting positions can be maintained,  the 
investor bears no  risk, but there is a social coat nonetheless because social 
transaction coats are being incurred simply to transfer revenue from other 
taxpayers to the investor in  question. 
It is clear that neither of these distortions of  the realization-based 
capital gaina tax system  would be  present under an  accrual tax.  The latter 
would tax income at the same rate regardlesa of  unrealized  appreciation or 
holding period.  The result  would be  a required rate of  return independent of 
these other characteristics.  It  is this result that we  refer to  ss 7 
"holding-period neutrality.' 
Definition:  A realization-baaed tax ayatem ia holding-period 
neutral if it leads each inveator in  an  aaaet to  require a 
before-tax return having a certainty-equivalent value that ia not & 
function of  the length of  holding period or  the asaet'a past 
pettern of  returns. 
We will  confirm later that a tax system satisfying this criterion does, 
indeed, makes the realization decision irrelevant. 
III.  Retrospective Taxation 
Suppose an  investor holds an  ssset that generates no  cash flows or  tax 
liabilities until it  is sold and is  taxed only upon sale.  We wish  to design a 
tax at  realization that satisfies the criterion of  holding-period neutrality, 
as just defined. 
One formulation that would satisfy this objective is the Vickrey (1939, 
1947) cumulative averaging approach.  With  the problem formulated in 
continuous time, if T5 is the total tax payment required of an  asset held  for 
s years  (with T0 — 0),  a Vickrey-type tax system would satisfy: 
(3)  — i(l-t)T  + tg A 
5  5  SS 
where g5 is the actual, ex jost, rate of  return on  the asset at  time (after 
purchase) s and A  is the asset's value at  date s.  It is clear from (3)  that 
such a tax system would be  equivalent to  actually taxing asset income on 
accrual but letting the tax liability accumulate at  the investor's opportunity 
cost until the asset is sold. 
As  already indicated, though, the tsx system described in  (3)  cannot be imposed retrospectively without knowledge of  the time pattern of  gains g5. 
However, this expression is not a necessary condition for a 
holding-period-neutral tax.  The fact that individual decisions are 
influenced by ex an  distributions  of returns rather than cx  returns 
allows us to  pursue a weaker condition. 
Suppose that, at  any date s, the investor knows the current value of  his 
asset but not its current rate of return.  Let V(') be the valuation operator 
at  each date that converts that date's distribution of  uncertain returns into 
their certainty equivalents, from the investor's perspective.  Then, intuition 
suggests that a holding-period-neutral tax system must  satisfy, at  each 
instant s,  the following condition: 
(4)  V(t5) — i(l-t)T5 + tiA5 
where, again, i is the risk-free interest rate (assumed to  be constant only 
for the sake of exposition).  Expression (4)  says that the investor faces an 
increase in  the realization tax liability associated with the asset equal to 
the interest on  the unpaid liability plus the ordinary tax on the asset based 
on  a rate of  return equal to the risk-free rate. 
The motivation for (4)  is that,  by  definition, the certainty-equivalent 
return on  risky assets should equal the risk-free rate if  investors' 
portfolios are balanced and taxes do  not distort behavior.  We  can formalize 
the relstionship of  expression (4)  to the achievement of 
holding-period-neutrality. 
Prooosition 1:  Condition (4)  is necessary and sufficient for the achievement 
of  holding period neutrality for the class of assets considered in this 
section. 9 
:  At any date s,  the net-of-tax value of  an asset to the investor is the 
value of  the asset A5  less the accumulated tax liability T5.  To 
continue to hold the asset for another instant, the investor requires a 
certainty-equivalent rate of  return equal to the after-tax interest 
rate i(l-t). Thus, in  portfolio equilibrium:3 
V(A5 - 'is)  — (A5 
- T5)i(l-t) 
Combined with  equation (4),  (5)  implies that  V(A5) — iA5,  regardless of  A5 or 
s.  Hence,  (4)  implies holding-period neutrality.  Combined with  the requirement 
fot holding-period neutrality that  V(A5) — iA5,  (5)  implies (4)QEo 
Since the certainty-equivalent value of  the before-tax asset return g 
will equal i when  an  accrual-equivalent tax is imposed, it is clear that the 
Vickrey-type tax system described in  (3)  satisfies (4),  and hence is 
holding-period neutral.  However, the converse need not be  true:  the class of 
tax systems defined by (4)  may be  larger.  The challenge is to find some other 
tax scheme also satisfying (4)  that has weaker informational requirements. 
Fortunately, such a tax system exists. 
Proposition 2:  Suppose the realization tax liability at  date s is 
T5 — (1 
-  e_t5)A5 
Then the tax system satisfies (4)  for all s and hence is holding-period 
neutral. 
flpf:  Taking the time derivative of  (6),  we  obtain: 
— (1 
- et5)A5 + tiet5A5 10 
— (1  - eti5)  (2)5A5- (leti5)tiA  + tiA 
— (1  -  e_ti5)  (()  -  tijA  +  tiA 
By  Proposition 1, V() 
— i  if  (4)  is satisfied.  Our strategy will be to 
assume V() 
— i.  Once proving that (4)  is satisfied, our assumption will 
prove correct.4 
If  V() 
— i, then  — i + c, where  £  is  a random return satisfying 
V(c) — 0.  (Note that, in general, E(c)  ' 0).  Hence, 
'F5 
—  (1 
- e_ti5)(i(l_t)  + c)A + tiA 
which, by  (6), may  be  written: 
(7)  — i(l -t)T5 + ciA5 + (1  - et5)csAs 
Since, by  construction, V(c) — 0,  application of V(')  to both sides of (7) 
yields  (4)•QED 
Clearly, the evolution of  the tax liability I5  described by (7)  differs 
from  that of  the Vickrey-type system based  on g  pg  returns described by 
(3).  Since the gain g  — i + c,  (7)  differs from (3)  in taxing the excess 
return  c  at  rate  (1 - et5)  rather than t.  This is a tax rate that 
starts at  0 and approaches 1 as a  -' .  But the tax rate on the excess return 
has no  effect on  the investor's welfare, because by  construction the excess 
return has zero value to him  (e.g.  Gordon 1985,  Sandmo l985). 
A simple example is useful  in  demonstrating how this tax system works to 
eliminate the lock-in effect.  Suppose an  investor purchased an  asset at some 
past  date 0.  At  date l' he  chooses  between realizing at price p1  and 11 
repurchasing the asset versus not realizing, in both cases realizing the asset 
again at some future date 2•  The asset's price at 2' p2,  is uncertain at 
but not influenced by  the investor's decision. 
Under the realization  strategy, the investor pays a tax of  p1(let5l) 
-it(s2-sj)  at  l and  p2(l-e 
)  at  Under  the alternative strategy, he 
pays  p2(let52) 
at  A comparison of  the two cases shows thst the choice 
-  its2  its1  it(s2-s1)  is between a tax payment of  e  (e  -l).p1e 
)  at  l 
versus 
eJt52(eit51.l).p2 
at  But the certainty-equivalent value of  p2 at 
is just  p1eit(525].), 
so  the investor is indifferent,  The  two 
cases differ only in  the  treatment of the asset's risk premium. 
Proposition 2 offers a very simple system of capital gains taxation. 
Computation of  the tax burden when  an  asset is sold requires knowledge of  the 
risk-free interest rate, the investor's marginal tax rate, the holding period 
of  the asset and the final sales price.  (Nothing in the proof depends on 
either i or  t being constant, so variations over time in  rates of  interest and 
marginal taxation present no difficulty.)  The initial purchase price, the 
pattern of  accrued gains and the asset's stochastic properties are irrelevant 
to the calculation.  The tax itself is expressed as a time-dependent fraction 
of  the asset's value at  sale, with this fraction going from 0 at  s — 0  to  I 
as 
To  interpret the tax formula (6),  consider again the Vickrey type tax 
system described in (3).  For a terminal asset value of  A, a holding period 
of a and a rate of  capital gain always equal to the risk-free rate (implying 
an  initial coat of Ae15), that system would impose a realization tax 
liability of 
(8)  T5 — t55  e  ta_(A_5z))d  — A5(l_et5) 12 
Thus, the tax schedule (6)  treats investors as  they had arrived at their 
current position by  investing at  risk-free rate.  Since in terms of certainty- 
equivalents, this is precisely what they did, the tax system "works" in the 
same way that a  Vickrey-type system would.7 
It is natural to ask whether there could be  other tax systems achieving 
holding-period neutrality based on  the same information.  Proposition 3 shows 
that this tax system is unique. 
Proposition 3:  The tax system described in  (6)  is the only one based on  the 
information set (t,i,s,A) that satisfies the condition for holding-period 
neutrality,  (4). 
Proof:  Consider a tax rule based on  the admissible information set: 
(9)  T  —  F(t,i,s,A) 
Differentiating (9) with  respect to  s  yields: 
(10)  'F  —F  +FA —F +FA(i+c )—F +FiA +Fc 
a  s  As  a  A  a  a  A  a  As 
Applying V(') to (10), and combining the result with (4)  and (9) to eliminate 
V(t) and T, we  obtain  the partial differential equation: 
(11)  i(lt)Fs 
+ jFA 
—  F  + 
Since  the division of  assets is arbitrary, it must be the case that F is 
homogeneous of degree one with  respect to A.  That is,  dividing an  asset into 13 
two pieces and realizing each half separately can have  no effect on  the 
capital gains tax liability.  Thus, there must exist some function F1(•) such 
that: 
(12)  F(i,t,s,A)  — F1(i,t,s).A 
Substituting the expression for 
F5 and FA  obtained from (12)  into (11), we 
obtain the ordinary differential equation: 
(13 
1  dF1  1F1—F1+ 
i(l-t)  ds  +  l-t  l-t 
which, combined with  the initial condition F1(i,t,O)—O, yields  the unique 
solution  F1(i,t,s) — (le1t5) and hence  T  — F(i,t,s,A)  — F1(i,t,s)A  — 
-its 
(1-c  )A.QED 
One may extend the tax system given in  (6)  to accommodate the more 
general situation in  which marginal tax rates vary across assets.  Suppose it 
is desired that income from the risk-free asset and the capital asset be taxed 
differentially, at rates  t'  and t, respectively.8  (For  t  C t', capital 
assets would be tax-favored.)  In  this case, the preceding analysis goes 
through for a required return before-tax equal to i(1-t')/(l-t).  That is, 
replacing (6) with 
r1-t' 
(6')  T5 — (1 
-  ethlTTEiJS)As 
results in  a flow tax rule: 
.1 1-tn 
(7')  — i(l-t')T5 + tiA5 + (1 
-  ethlTi2E  J5)c5A5 
Once again, the investor is charged the relevant after-tax interest rate 14 
i(l-t') on  the outstanding tax liahility and taxed on  the certainty-equivalent 
accruals of  income at the capital aaset's tax rate  t.  The significance of 
this result is that it shows that holding-period-neutral retrospective 
taxation is perfectly compatible with the favorable tax treatment of  capital 
assets.  The tax benefit need not be  provided via e distortionary deferral 
advantage. 
If investors face different tax rates and, indeed, even if they receive 
different relative after-tax returns on  different assets, the analysis applies 
to each  investor individually, as long as he  is in portfolio equilibrium, with 
after-tax risk-adjusted return equal to his opportunity coat.  That is, 
(6')  and (7')  always imply that the investor  will  require a certainty- 
equivalent before-tax return of  i(4..), even  if the ratio  (l-t')/(l-t) 
varies across the population.  By construction, the risk premium  c  equals 
the total return g  less the required, risk-adjusted before-tax return i(_.._), 
so differences in  imply  different risk premia on  the same asset for 
different investors.  But this is precisely what gives rise to portfolio 
sorting and clientele formation, with investors holding diversified portfolios 
but gravitating toward those assets in  which they obtain a relatively 
favorable trade-off between risk and return (Auerbach and King  1983).  In 
equilibrium, each investor will require the available risk premium to hold 
each risky asset, assuming there is an  interior solution to the portfolio 
choice problem.9 
Thus, for the class of  assets considered in  this section, a simple 
realization-based tax system exists that is holding-period neutral, has 
limited informational requirements, and can be  applied under a tax system with 
marginal tax rates that vary  over time,  assets and investors.  We  next show 
how the tax system described by (6)  can be  generalized for the class of assets 15 
broader than those yielding returns only upon sale.  The tax formula becomes 
more complicated  than that described in (6)  but follows the same approach. 
IV,  The General Tsx System 
Most  assets presently subject to capital gains taxes generate cash flows 
and are subject to tax charges before disposition of the assets themselves. 
In the case of corporate equities, shareholders receive dividends and pay 
taxes on  them.  For other assets, taxes and cash flows may not be  so closely 
tied.  For real estate investments  qualifying for accelerated depreciation 
allowances, for example, investors might in some years receive positive cash 
flows and tax refunds at  the same time while in  later years paying taxes equal 
to a substantial fraction of  cash flows.  In this section we treat the general 
class of  assets with arbitrary patterns of  cash flows and tax payments. 
Let D5 be the cash distcibution received at  date s,  and let r5  be the tax 
payment made  at  date  s.  For some assets, we might impose a restriction 
relating r5 to 115, but this is unnecessary for the derivation of  a 
holding-period neutral capital gains tax.  To  the extent that there are 
transaction costs associated with purchasing, selling or holding the asset, 
these can be treated as negative distributions. 
We follow the same strategy as in Section III,  first discussing the 
evolution of  the tax liability T that is necessary to ensure holding-period 
neutrality.  As  before, we assuise initially that the government wishes  to tax 
all asset income at  a single rate t. 
Proposition 4:  For the general class of assets  just described, the following 
condition is necessary and sufficient for a tax to be  holding-period 
neutral: 16 
(14)  V(T55 — i(lt)T5 + tiA5 - 
£rQ1:  Following the proof of  Proposition 1, we  note that the yield on  the 
net of  tax asset value A-T must equal i(l-t).  This yield consists of 
the return on the asset D plus the net capital gain A - t minus  the tax 
payment r; thus1° 
(15)  V(A5 
-  t5) + O 
-  —  (As 
- T5)i(l-t) 
Combined with equation (14), (15)  implies that V(A5) +  — iAn,  regardless of 
A  or a.  Hence (14)  implies holding-period neutrality.  Combined with  the 
requirement for holding-period neutrality that V(A5) + O  — iAa,  that the 
before-tax return required in  the asset be  independent of  A5 or  a,  (15) 
implies (14)QED 
Expression (14)  aaya that, in computing their increase in tax liability 
investors should be  given credit for taxea paid  currently.  Again, such a 
provision is preaent in  Vickrey's original scheme.  As  before, the rule 
described in (14) is less restrictive in that it applies to  the valuation of 
returns ex  ante rather than actual g  ppg  returns in  each state of  nature. 
Once again, there is a tax syatem that will  satisfy (14) without requiring 
information on  the pattern of  an asset's growth in  value. 
Proposition 5:  Suppose the realization tax liability is: 
(16)  T5  — (1  eti5)A5 
- ei(t)5[fg(e_e(1t)t)Dzdz  + fge(1t)5rdz] 
Then  the tax system satisfies (14)  for all s  and hence  is holding-period 17 
neutral. 
rQL:  Taking the time derivative of (16),  we  obtain (substituting (16)  into 
the result): 
— (I-e)A + tie t15A5 + i(l-t)[T5 
-  (let15)As] 
i(1-t)s  -is  -i(1-t)s  -i(1-t)s  -e  [(e  -e  )D5 + a  r5] 
—  (let15)((2) 
-  i)A+ tiA  + i(l-t)T  + (1et15)Ds 
- 
—  (let15)(() 
+  D  -  i)A5  + nA5  + i(1-t)T5 
- 
Again,  without restriction (see the proof of  Proposition 2) we  may assume 
that the risk-adjusted, before-tax required return V()  +  D  — i, ao that 
+  D — i + c  with  V(c) — 0.  Thus, 
(17)  — i(1-t)T5  + tiA5 
-  +  (let15)csAs 
Since, by  construction, V(c) — 0,  application of V(.) to  both sides of  (17) 
yields (14)•QEo 
As in  the previous case, the solution involves taxing the asset's risk 
premium at  a rate (1 - e_t15)  rather than  t.  A  way  of  interpreting (16) is 
to rewrite it as: 
(16')  T5 
—  (1-e  t15)(Aa + J  eDdz)  - (f eDdz 
- jg e  t)(a-z)Ddz) 
- 18 
The term (A5  + jg eD5dz)  is the present value, at date s,  of the asset 
plus all previous distributions.  Thus, the tax scheme  begins by  treating this 
entire value as subject to the tax rate (1 - eti5), as in  Section III.  Had 
all distributions been received tax free and reinvested in  the asset itself,11 
this would be  appropriate, for then the asset would be of  the type analyzed 
there.  However, because taxes have been  paid in the past and the 
distributions invested elsewhere, two corrections are necessary for taxes 
already paid.  The last term in  (16') is a  credit  for taxes already paid 
directly on  the asset, while the middle term in (16')  is an  imputation for 
taxes paid  on  the income generated by  distributions invested in  other assets 
facing an income tax rate t.  That is,  the treatment of  distributions as 
having been  reinvested in the same asset assumes that they continue to 
generate income at the before-tax rate of  return  i, adjusted for risk.  Since 
they were actually invested in other assets, which we may assume to face an 
accrual-equivalent income tax rate t, we  are therefore ignoring the subsequent 
income taxes attributable to such reinvested distributions.  The present value 
of these imputed taxes at date a  is (f e()Dzdz 
- f  e(]tX5)Dzdz). 
Thus, the tax system in (16)  can be interpreted as treating all distributions 
as being reinvested and then  applying the tax scheme described in  Section III, 
but giving credit for taxes paid along the way. 
Yet another interpretation of  expression (16)  follows from the following 
logic.12  As  is well  known, share repurchases and  dividends are equivalent 
except for their tax treatment and,  in  this case, even the tax treatment is 
the same.  Thus,  one should be  able to view each  distribution as  a share 
repurchase.  Since each such repurchase amounts to the investor's realization 
of part of his assets, consistent treatment based on  Proposition 1  ought to 
suffice.  If  each "partial" asset sale receives such treatment, there ought to 19 
be no  deviation needed when  the remainder of  the asaet is sold.  Indeed, this 
conjecture is correct.  Collecting terms in  (16),  we  obtain: 
(16'')  T  — (let15)A  + f5et51)[(leYtfr)Dr)dz 
which says that the household's tax liability at  date s equals the normal one 
due on  asset without previous distributions or tax payments plus the 
accumulated deficit in tax payments on  previous "realizations", i.e. 
distributions 13 
Thus, one very simple approach to the achievement of  holding period 
neutrality is to tax every distribution from s capital asset at the rate 
(le_t15),  where s is the time since the asset's purchase.  In  this event, the 
informational requirements are no  worse than in  the previous case without 
distributiona  - 
More  generally,  expression  (16)  Ia  more  complex  than  expression  (6)  ,  but 
its informational requirements are still minimal.  In addition to  what  was 
needed in  the previous case, the government now must also know the flows of 
previous taxes and distributions on  the asset. 
A record of previous taxes can be  obtained from past  tax returns.  In 
many  instances, as with common stock, the taxes are directly based on  the 
distributions, so records of  the distributions themselves are juat  as easily 
available.  Even in cases where the taxes r and distributions P are not sc 
simply related (real estate investaents  for example), the law requires 
taxpayers to supply enough information  so that the distributions can be 
recovered.  For example, a real estate investor  would add interest payments 
and depreciation deductions back  to reported profits in order to  calculate the 
distribution from a property in  a given year. 20 
As before, the tax rule can be extended to the case of different tax 
rates on  capital assets (t)  and other income (t')  by  replacing the interest 
rate i with  the required before-tax return i(l-t')/(l-t).  In  cases where t 
is known, this is a simple change.  There are more complicated cases, though, 
where tax preferences are given not via a reduction in  t  but through tax 
credits or  accelerated depreciation, each of  which affects the present value 
of  r.  In  this case, it is necessary to determine what  effective tax rate  t 
is desired, and base  the calculation in (16) on  this value.  Once this has 
been  done, the continued presence or absence of  tax credits or accelerated 
depreciation becomes irrelevant, for variations in these are simply offset by 
changes in  the last term of (16). 
For example, suppose the government wishes to lower an asset's effective 
tax rate from  t' — .4  to  t — .2,  and might use an  investment tax credit to 
do  so.  Once t  — .2  is used to  compute T in (16),  the investment tax credit 
may be  kept; but since it appears as a reduction in  taxes paid by the 
investor in  the last term in (16),  it will simply increase  T  by an  amount 
equal in  present value.  Put another way, the formula ensures that the 
specified effective tax rate will be  achieved, regardless of  the specific 
pattern of tax payments chosen by  the government (or,  for that matter, the 
investor who might choose or  be required to make  contributions toward his 
accumulating tax liability). 
IV.  Conclusion 
This paper has presented a scheme that taxes capital gains upon 
realization without inducing a lock-in effect or providing the opportunity for 
tax arbitrage.  The scheme requires information that is either publicly 
available (such as interest rates) or present on  previous tax returns (such aa 21 
past tax payments) but not the private (or potentially even unavailable) 
information on the time pattern of an  asset's accrued gains.  The scheme's 
simplicity may obscure  its  quite general applicability.  It may be used  for 
any assets subject to capital gains or  losses, essentially all classes of 
assets,  this includes not only cossson stock and real estate, for which 
capital gains treatment has historically been  considered significant, but 
also, for example, depreciable assets, which currently are subject to capital 
gains taxes but also receive fixed,  depreciation  allowances in lieu  of 
deductions for accrued economic depreciationJ4 
Nothing about the tax system described here requires that all asset 
income be  taxed at  the same rate for a  particular investor.  Purchases of 
certain assets can still be encouraged through a lower overall tax burden, 
without the need  to resort to 4  2t  measures such as accelerated depreciation 
or distortionary ones such as low rates of  realization-based capital gains 
taxes that exacerbate the lock-in effect and the problem of  tax arbitrage. 
In achieving the econoaic benefits of  accrual taxation without its 
associated liquidity or  information  problems, the new approach makes a  move 
toward a less distortionary capital gains tax feasible and eliminates the need 
for the additional distortions induced by  such anti-arbitrage provisions as 
limited loss offsets. 22 
Footnotes 
1.  The tax system elready has elements that effect accrual taxation, such 
as the mark-to-market requirements instituted in the 1981 Economic 
Recovery Tax Act to reduce tax arbitrage activity involving commodity 
straddles  - 
2.  If  the tax system is not indexed for inflation, then  this rate should he 
viewed as a nominal interest rate.  Moreover, in  the absence of  a risk- 
free asset, one may reinterpret the paper's results in  terms of  a "zero- 
beta" asset that carries no  risk premium. 
3.  It might be argued that the investor may not achieve an  interior 
solution to  the portfolio choice problem in the case of assets subject 
to capital gains taxes.  For example, one cannot freely buy and sell 
assets that are indexed by  having already  been  held  for a specified time 
period.  However, our focus here is on the case in  which the holding 
period becomes irrelevant to  the portfolio choice problem.  fortiori, 
the assumption of  portfolio balance is justified. 
4.  It is straightforward to show that this solution for required 
holding-period yields is unique.  That is,  there exists no  other rate of 
return  j L i  for which the implied tax rule corresponding to (7)  is in 
fact consistent with the portfolio balance condition (5)  and the assumed 
rate of  return j. 
5.  In  fact, as Cordon shows, the same general equilibrium outcome results 
from  tax systems differing only in  their treatment of  excess returns, if 
private risk-pooling is efficient.  Otherwise, taxes on  excess returns 
that have no  value to investors may be  pooled by  the government, 
creating value and reducing aggregate risk.  In  this event, the tax rate 
on  risk premia influences the equilibrium outcome, even though the 23 
investor's holding-period decision is not distorted. 
6.  Since the tax liability is bounded by  the asset's value, the liquidity 
problem disappears under this  tax systea.  It  is important to  stress 
that such an  accumulating tax liability over time works to remove the 
lock-in effect only if the tax is eventually imposed.  A provision that 
eliminates capital gains tax liability at death, for example, might 
cause the lock-in effect to be  exacerbated by  a move to  such a tax 
system, since investors would have an even greater incentive to hold  "to 
the end". 
7.  This utilization of g  equivalence does suggest a potential 
political problem in implementing the retrospective tax scheme.  It 
taxes investors on  what, in a sense,  their gains should have been. 
this  means taxing  winners' and losers'  wealth at the same rate, 
treating them all as if their current  wealth had been  accumulated at  the 
safe rate of  return. 
8.  One could conceive of  a variety of opcimal tax or second-best arguments 
leading to such an objective.  For example, see Auerbach (1981) or the 
related discussion in  Sandmo (1985). 
9.  Such a solution will not exist, for example, if assets with different 
tax characteristics have the same return distributions, as in  the case 
of  perfect certainty.  In such cases, constraints on  investors' 
positions, on  borrowing or short sales,  perhaps, are required for any 
equilibrium  to exist and corner solutions for individual portfolios will 
arise.  Here, the equivalence among after-tax returns holds only if 
shadow prices on  the binding constraints  are taken into account.  See 
Auerbach and King (1983).  If,  for example, an  investor held  no  taxable 
debt, only  tax exempt municipal bonds, the appropriate after-tax 24 
opportunity cost would be the interest rate on municipal bonds. 
10.  We  assume for the sake of  exposition that D5 and r5 are known at date s, 
but this has no  affact on  the validity of  the derivation. 
11.  The asset "itself" here  refers to the account established for an  asset, 
not a specific asset.  If  the unit  of  account were  a business, for 
axample, a corporation reinvesting all its profits would  be such an 
asset. 
12.  I am  grateful to Doug Bernheim for this suggestion. 
13.  It  is particularly clear from (16'')  why the initial purchase price does 
not appear in  the tax calculation.  One could view  this initial cost as 
a  negative distribution at  date zero, but the appropriate  tax on  this 
negative distribution would  ha  zero. 
14.  The economic effects of  fixed depreciation allowances in  the case of 
risky depreciation is discussed by  Auerbach (1983) and Bulow and Summers 
(1984). 25 
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